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RECENT DECISIONS
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - GOOD FAITH BARGAINING - EMPLOYER'S INSISTENCE
UPON BENEFICIAL CONTRACT Is NOT PER SE EVIDENCE OF BAD FAITH BARGAINING. -
Petitioners sought to have a cease and desist order of the NLRB set aside.1 The Board's
order was based on findings that petitioners had violated the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act2 by making various threats and promises to the employees, instituting several
unilateral wage increases without consulting the employees' representatives, and failing
to bargain in good faith. In regard to the refusal to bargain in good faith, it was found
that throughout the negotiations, petitioners insisted upon provisions which gave the
union little, if any, real voice in important aspects of employment relations. The Board
felt that, although "none of the petitioners' proposals in the negotiations were in them-
selves violative of the act, taken as a whole they reflected bad faith. The court found
substantial evidence to support the 8(a) (1) violations in coercing the employees; how-
ever, regarding the 8(a) (5) violation, it held: petition granted. The fact that an em-
ployer insists on a contract which leaves the employees in no better state than they were
without it is not a failure to bargain in good faith. White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th
Cir. 1958).
Since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935,8 it has been unlawful for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .. . ."4 The
NLRB and courts quickly added the requirement that the bargaining be carried on in
good faith. 5 This need for implication was eliminated in 1947 with the enactment of the
Labor Management Relations Act, whereby the parties are expressly required "to confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment .... ." Good faith is a question of fact for the Board,7 and its decision will not be
overthrown if supported by substantial evidence.8
The purpose of § 8(a) (5) is not to compel employers to reach an agreement with
their employees, 9 nor to dictate to the parties what provisions are to be contained in any
agreement they might reach.' 0 Rather, the purpose is to require the parties "to enter into
discussion with an open and fair mind and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agree-
ment . . . ."11 The obvious goal of the legislation is the reconciliation of demands on
both sides in the form of a compromise agreement. Therefore, it is a subjective state of
mind to which the Board and courts must address themselves in considering alleged
violations of § 8(a) (5).
As with all subjective standards, there is the immediate difficulty of determining
what the requirement entails. It is impossible to state with certainty which of the many
aspects of the employer-employee relationship has exerted the greatest influence; but it
is clear that reliance is placed on no one factor. Both the Board' 2 and the courts' s have
phrased tests which are substantially the same. They require a consideration of the sum
1 White's Uvalde Mines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1957).
2 61 Stat 140, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (5) (1952).
3 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
4 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
5 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
6 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
7 Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941).
8 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1952).
9 Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
10 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 595 (1935).
11 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
12 Gay Paree Undergarment, 91 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
is NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir. 1953).
(125)
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total of the employer's acts, in the hope that such consideration will indicate either an
elaborate pretense by the employer with no real effort to reach an agreement, or an
actual attempt at good faith bargaining within the meaning of the act. To reach such a
determination, the history of the parties' labor relations1 4 and the negotiations them-
selves' 5 are relevant factors.
In regard to negotiations, no one is denied the right to advocate a contract favorable
to himself if, while doing so, he has a sincere desire to reach an agreement.' 6 However,
in order to facilitate the negotiations, the employer has been required to give reasons for
the position he has assumed, and a mere terse statement of his position has been held to
be a sign of bad faith.1 7 Also, the rejection of proposals put forth by the union, without
explanation, has been held indicative of bad faith bargaining.' 8 However, the extent to
which a company must state reasons for its own position or the rejection of union pro-
posals is not clear. In some instances, the company has been required to furnish the
union with information to substantiate its position;' 9 yet one need not furnish informa-
tion unless a failure to do so would hamper negotiations. 2 0
Within the negotiations themselves, both the Board and courts have given much
consideration to the presentation of counterproposals. 2' The act expressly states that a
party need not concede to a proposal advanced by the other party.22 However, if one
party is truly acting in good faith, it seems reasonable to ask that he return a counter-
proposal; consequently, a failure to advance them has been held indicative of bad
faith.28 The Board also has frowned upon counterproposals which do no more than con-
tinue the status quo.24
In the instant case, the Board contended that the "record as a whole" indicated
substantial evidence that the employer had not bargained in good faith. In considering
the "record as a whole," the majority disjoined the unilateral wage increases and the
coercive action taken by the employer, thereby leaving only the attitude reflected by
the proposals and counterproposals. The opinion then concluded that since none of these
were per se evidence of bad faith, they could not collectively or separately constitute
such proof.
The majority opinion's segregation of the unilateral wage increases is not contrary
to present case law, 25 since increases were granted to only five workers, out of a total of
sixty. Each of the cases cited by the Board concerned general wage increases to groups
of employees rather than the merit increases to individuals, as found in the instant case.
However, the court's failure to consider the coercive acts found to violate § 8(a) (1) is
more difficult to accept. Earlier cases have held that acts in violation of § 8(a) (1), pre-
ceding or during negotiations, have been considered noteworthy in an attempt to char-
acterize the attitude with which the employer approached the bargaining table.2 6 They
constitute a valid background against which other acts of the parties can be evaluated.
14 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., supra note 13, at 139.
15 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
16 Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
17 Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941).
Is Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 17, at 136; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 114
F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1940).
19 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1955); NLRB v. 3. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th
Cir. 1948) enforcing 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946); Sherman-Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforce-
ment granted per curiam, 130 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1942).
20 Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540 (1946).
21 Adams Bros. Manifold Printing Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 974 (1939); Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103
F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
22 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
23 Singer Mfg Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941).
24 Benson Produce Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 888 (1946).
25 NLRB v. Crompton-Hlighland Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1948); May Dept Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S.
376 (1945); Armstrong Cork Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1954).
26 Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 1942). See also NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 155 (1955) (concurring opinion).
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As a reason for its failure to consider the violations, the majority states that neither in
the Board's opinion nor its brief is the matter mentioned. However, it is expressly stated
in the Board's opinion 27 that it adopted the findings of the examiner, who found that
these acts were performed while the negotiations were in progress. According to Uni-
versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,28 an appellate court, in determining substantive evidence,
is not precluded from considering the findings of the trial examiner.
The decision of the majority on what it considered to be the "record as a whole"
also can not pass without criticism. Not only did the company demand a contract ex-
tremely favorable to itself, but it also failed to give any reason why such a contract was
necessary; nor did it give reasons for refusing to accept the union proposals. They were
dismissed with the summary comment that they were "not substantially different from
the first." With the exception of five "concessions" or "counterproposals," there is
nothing to indicate that the company offered to change its original position, and a glance
at these "concessions" shows little, if any, change of position.2 9 The company agreed
not to discriminate against employees because of union membership, but that was its
obligation under the Labor Management Relations Act. It added a "no-lock-out" clause,
but refused to accept liability for its breach. It agreed to certain wage increases, but
demanded unilateral control over all such increases. Finally, it would permit the union
limited bulletin-board space for its notices, and allow the use of the office and com-
missary area for the collection of dues. These seem insignificant when contrasted with
the negotiations as a whole, and did little to change the status quo. Viewed in this light,
the Board's ruling of bad faith seems far from unreasonable.
The entire court agreed that the § 8(a) (1) violations were supported by substantial
evidence. The dissenting opinion considered "these violations, along with other evidence,
both positive and negative" in reaching its conslusion of bad faith 30 This approach
seems more in keeping with the established tests and the spirit of the act. The majority
seems too concerned with appraising the objective validity of the particular proposals
and acts of the company rather than using the entire record for its determination.
Alfred Kaelin
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REGISTRATION STATUTES - STATE STATUTES REQUIRING
REGISTRATION OF ANYONE ENGAGING IN AcTIVrTIEs AFFECTING INTEGRATION OR SEG-
REGATION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - Petitioners, two corporations, brought action to
secure a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining enforcement of five Virginia
statutes,' as being violative of the fourteenth amendment.2 Briefly, two of the statutes,
chapters 31 and 32, require registration with a state authority of any person or corpora-
tion engaged in promoting or opposing the rights of any race or color by lobbying or
advocacy, or whose "activities tend to cause racial conflicts or violence." The other
three, chapters 33, 35 and 36, relate to procedures for suspension and revocation of
attorneys' licenses, and to the crimes of barratry, champerty and maintenance.3 Held:
injunction granted. Chapters 31, 32 and 35 were unconstitutional because the former
two abridged petitioners' right to free speech and the latter was violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses. Chapters 33 and 36 were vague and ambiguous,'
27 White's Uvalde Mines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1958).
28 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951).
29 White's Uvalde Mines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1128, 1159 (1958).
80 255 F.2d at 570.
1 VA. CODE ANN. § § 18-349.9-.37, 54-74,78,79 (Supp. 1958).
2 A three-judge federal district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952).
3 The scope of this comment encompasses the court's treatment of chapters 31 and 32. Space does
not permit an analysis of the issues presented by chapters 33, 35 and 36.
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and their constitutionality would not be passed on until after state courts had interpreted
them. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), petition for cert. filed sub.
nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3379 (U.S. June 25, 1958) (No. 1093,
1957 Term; renumbered No. 127, 1958 Term); prob. juris. noted, 79 S. Ct. 33 (1958).
Before it could determine the constitutionality of the statutes in question, the court
had to contend with two formidable jurisdictional attacks: First, a federal court should
not pass on the constitutionality of a state statute prior to an authoritative interpretation
by a state court;4 secondly, a corporation cannot be said to be deprived of the civil rights
of freedom of speech and of assembly because the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons. 5
The theory of the first defense is within the well-defined policy of the Supreme
Court to avoid considering constitutional questions whenever possible.6 However, this
does not mean that federal courts are powerless to act until a state court has rendered a
decision. Federal statutes expressly confer jurisdiction to federal courts where civil rights
have been violated,7 or where federal questions are involved.8 The Supreme Court up-
held the power of a federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of a state licensing
and regulatory statute in Doud v Hodge9 because of its repugnance to the Constitution,
despite the fact that the state courts had not yet rendered a definitive decision as to the
meaning or constitutionality of the statute.
The majority in the instant case interpreted the policy of the Supreme Court as en-
deavoring to grant cautious discretion to district courts in determining whether jurisdic-
tion should be exercised in the absence of an authoritative state court decision. They
reasoned that where a statute is free from ambiguity and no reasonable interpretation
will render it constitutional, jurisdiction should be exercised in order to bring about an
expeditious and final determination of its constitutionality. 10
The jurisdiction of the court was also disputed on the ground that petitioners were
corporations, created under the laws of New York, and not "persons" entitled to bring
suit for deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities granted by the Constitution" and
the Civil Rights Act 1 2 of the United States. In Hague v. CIO,13 the Supreme Court held
that "natural persons" and they alone were entitled to the privileges and immunities
guaranteed citizens of the United States. Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion, went
further and said that the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of
natural, not artificial persons. 14 However, a case prior to Hague held that freedom of
speech was safeguarded by the due process clause against abridgment by state legislation,
and that although a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the privileges and
immunities clause, it is a person within the meaning of the equal protection and due
process clauses. 15 Subsequent cases have held that a corporation is also a "person"
within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.' 6
However, these cases involved corporations whose apparent purpose was the pur-
suit of profit for its shareholders. Consequently, the issues involved were centered on
4 Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v Windsor, 116 F. Supp. 354, 357
(N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 901 (1954); Railroad Comm'n v. Texas, 312 U.S. 496,
501 (1941).
5 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (concurring opinion).
6 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring opinion).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1952).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
9 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
10 159 F. Supp. at 523.
11 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952).
13 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
14 Hague v. CIO, supra note 13, at 527.
15 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). See alio Jos. Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, U.S. 331 (1946).
16 McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1951); Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc'y v. Los Angeles County, 181 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1950).
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property rights of the corporations. The corporations in the present case were distin-
guished on the grounds that they were non-profit organizations whose goal was the pro-
tection of the personal liberties of their natural members. They alleged that past experi-
ence had shown the necessity of utilizing a corporation or similar large-scale organiza-
tion to safeguard the rights of their defenseless members. The-court, after reviewing the
historical development of the broad construction of the word "person" within the four-
teenth amendment, concluded that the same liberality should be used when a corpora-
tion is formed not for profit but for the protection of the liberties of natural persons.1 7
The Supreme Court, in a decision subsequent to the instant case--NAACP v
Alabama ex rel. Patterson's - had occasion to pass on this issue, since it was objected
that the NAACP had no standing to prosecute such an action. Reviewing past decisions,
the Court.found that although parties usually must rely on coiistitutional rights personal
to themselves, 19 nevertheless, where the individual constitutional rights of a group of
persons could not be effectively vindicated except through a proper representative, it
was permissable for the Court to pass on the constitutional questions involved.2 0 The
Court then upheld the right of the NAACP to assert the constitutional rights of its mem-
bers who were not parties to the litigation, because of its nexus with them. This decision,
along with the ruling in the present case, seems to have avoided the issue of a corpora-
tion's rights under the fourteenth amendment by "piercing the veil" of the NAACP and
granting the remedy directly to the natural persons involved.
Before considering the statutes in question, the court in the instant case considered
some of the prior acts of state officials, in an attempt to evaluate the purpose for which
the statutes were passed. It is a well-settled principle that legislative motive-whether
good or bad-may not be scrutinized by a court. 21 However, the contrary holds for
legislative purpose, especially when the constitutionality of the act is questioned.22 The
Supreme Court in Lane v. Wilson23 looked into legislative history to show that a state
statute was merely an attempt to avoid the earlier decision of Guinn v. United States,24
in which the "grandfather" clause of an earlier statute had been held unconstitutional.
Thus, in order to discern the Virginia legislative purpose, the court took note of a
special legislative commission's conclusion that compulsory integration should be re-
sisted, a resolution of the Virginia General Assembly decrying the segregation decisions,
and a speech by the Governor before the General Assembly urging the passage of anti-
integration legislation. 25 The majority concluded that the statutes were merely one
method of carrying out a plan of general resistance against integration which had re-
sulted in a loss of members and revenues to the NAACP.
The majority's use of reports and speeches to show legislative purpose seems
reasonable since they were matters of public record and were, in part, the utterances of
a state officer in his official capacity. The Supreme Court has recently stated that the
segregation decisions can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislatures,
executives, or judicial officers, nor indirectly through evasive schemes for segregation,
whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously."2 6
17 159 F. Supp. at 519.
18 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
19 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
20 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 186-87 (1951) (concurring opinion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-36 (1925).
21 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
22 Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 878-80 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933
(1949).
23 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
24 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
25 159 F. Supp. at 512-14. These ideas were enacted into law, part of which was declared uncon-
stitutional in Adkins v. School Board, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
26 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (dictum).
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Lastly, the instant court considered the constitutional issue. The court found that
in the past, revelation of membership in the NAACP had led to economic reprisals,
threats of coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility which adversely affected
the ability of the Association and its members to advocate their beliefs. Yet, conceding
this, if the state can show an over-riding interest in the disclosure of membership lists
which is sufficient to justify the probable deterrent effect of such disclosure, the statute
will be brought under the police powers of the state. 27 In an analogous case, New York
ex reL Bryant v. Zimmerman,28 the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute which
required associations having an oath as a condition of membership to file lists of their
members and officers with a state official. The statute was specifically aimed at curtailing
the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. It was held that the statute did not violate the- due
process clause because the state, for its own protection, is entitled to disclosure as a
deterrent to possible violations of the law. The majority in the instant case distinguished
Zimmerman on the ground that the New York statute was aimed at curbing the activities
of an association likely to engage in violations of the law, while the Virginia statute was
aimed at curbing the activities of an association trying to abide by and enforce the law
and whose members had not engaged in acts of violence or disturbances of the public
peace. 29 It concluded that the statutes requiring registration of anyone engaged in pro-
moting or opposing in any manner the passage of legislation by the General Assembly
on behalf of any race or color, or who advocates racial integration or segregation, were
an unconstitutional restriction on the right of free speech.30
In a decision subsequent to the instant case, the Supreme Court has held that com-
pulsory disclosure of membership lists, similar to the disclosure required by the Virginia
statute, abridges the rights of rank-and-file members of the NAACP to engage in lawful
associations in support of their common interests and that this right is an inseparable
aspect of liberty assured by the fourteenth amendment.3 1 It was reasoned that in many
circumstances inviolability of privacy in group associations may be indispensable to the
preservation of freedom of association, particularly when the group espouses unpopular
beliefs.3 2
The defendants have petitioned the decision for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
It is submitted that the Court will find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in accepting jurisdiction and that it will find the elaborate registration statutes uncon-
stitutional for the reasons cited by the majority.
An honest recognition of the realities of the present situation shows that if the
activities of the NAACP were outlawed, the state of Virginia could use all its resources
to find lawful methods to carry out its avowed intention of postponing and, if possible,
defeating the constitutional rights of a group of its citizens, while that group would be
deprived of the resources needed to resist such an attack.
John F. Beggan
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - IMPLEADER - IMPLEADING JOINT TORT-
FEASOR PERMITTED IN DIVERSITY ACTION ALTHOUGH STATE PROHIBrrED PRESENT IN-
DEPENDENT ACTION. - The original plaintiff brought a negligence action against the
defendant, plaintiff here, in federal court, alleging he was injured on May 4, 1955.
27 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950). See also Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
28 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
29 159 F. Supp. at 526. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357-U.S. 449, 465 (1958) up-
holding this distinction and pointing out that the Supreme Court had taken judicial notice of the
particular character of the Klan's activities which it assumed was before the legislature when the
statute was enacted.
30 159 F. Supp. at 524.
31 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra note 29, at 462-53.
32 Cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56-58 (1953) (concurring opinion).
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Jurisdiction was based ofi diversity of citizenship. On February 13, 1957, defendant
was granted leave to implead the Recon Co. as third-party defendant on alternative
claims of either indemnity or contribution.' In its answer, filed on May 28, 1957,
Recon moved to strike all reference to a claim for contribution for the reason that
the third-party plaintiff had not yet discharged any common liability as is required
by the applicable Rhode Island statute. In addition, it asserted that the Rhode Island
two-year statute of limitations had run, precluding recovery of contribution. 2 The
motion to strike was granted and the third-party plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed.
The original defendant may implead a joint tort-feasor even though his right to a
judgment for contribution must await payment of more than his pro rata share of
a common liability, and the filing of the third-party complaint tolls the statute of
limitations if filed within the two year period of limitation. D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v.
Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958).
Rule 14(a) provides for the impleader of a person "who is or may be liable" to
the defendant for all or a part of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant.8 It is
well established that for the purposes of the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,4
the right to contribution from a co-tort-feasor is a matter of substantive law which
is determined by reference to the applicable state law in diversity suits. 5 Conse-
quently, whenever the substantive law of the state does not allow contribution among
joint tort-feasors impleader under Rule 14(a) is not allowed.6
At. common law, by virtue of the decision in Merryweather v. Nixan,7 contri-
bution among joint tort-feasors was denied only when the tortious act resulted from
intentional or wilful conduct on their part. However, by judicial interpretation in the
United States, this doctrine was extended to deny contribution where the conduct of
the joint tort-feasors was merely negligent.8 This common law non-contribution rule
has been severely criticized by leading authorities,9 and in some jurisdictions the
denial of contribution has been limited by judicial decision to situations involving
wilful or intentional misconduct.' 0 In the absence of statute, however, the majority
of states continue to apply the common law rule and in these states the Erie doctrine
prohibits invocation of Rule 14(a) by the defendant joint tort-feasor. 11
The severity of the common law non-contribution rule has persuaded many
states to adopt statutes permitting contribution to both negligent and wilful joint tort-
1 Pursuant to the Rhode Island Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, R.I. GEN. L&Nws ANN. §
10-6 (1957).
2 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-6-4 (1957), provides:
A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until
he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro-
rata share thereof. Actions for contribution shall be commenced and sued within
two (2) years next after the cause of action shall accrue to the injured person, and
not after. (Emphasis added.)
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 136 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1943); Fontenot v. Roach,
120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); Kravas v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66
(W.D. Pa. 1939).
6 Friend v. Middle Adt. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946)
(applying Connecticut law); Roth v. Greyhound Corp., 149 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (ap-
plying Indiana law); Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.S.C. 1948) (applying South Carolina law).
7 8 Term. R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (KIB. 1799). Although this case did not state the
general rule, subsequent cases construing the decision formulated this rule. Cf. PROSsER, ToRTs 247
(2d ed. 1955).
8 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & 0. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
9 1 HARER & JA Es, ToRTs § 10.2 (1956); PRossER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 248.
10 Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Campbell v. Maine Cent. Transp. Co.,
20 F.R.D. 629 (D. Me. 1957) following Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 At. 815 (1918); Jacobs
v. Pollard, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105 (1852).
11 See cases cited note 6 supra; U.S. v. Accord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
975 (1954) (applying Oklahoma law); Andromidas v. Theisen Bros., 94 F. Supp. 150 (D. Neb.
1950) (applying Nebraska law).
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feasors. 12 These statutes generally contain one of two *rovisions governing the
right to contribution. The first type permits contribution only among tort-feasors
whom the plaintiff has chosen to sue and against whom he has obtained a joint judg-
ment.13 Under this type of statute the federal courts have denied impleader of a
joint tort-feasor where it was sought on the grounds of a "possible" liability for
contribution, except in those instances where the plaintiff amends his complaint to
claim relief against the new party.14 However, construction of the Texas contri-
bution statute would seem to permit the use of Rule 14(a) against a joint tort-feasor
not a party to the original suit.15 The general refusal to permit impleader under this
type of statute seems sound since a contrary holding would give the defendant an
action in the federal courts which could not be had in the state tribunals, thus extend-
ing his substantive rights in a manner not permissible under the Erie doctrine.
The second type of statutes, 16 as well as the recommended Uniform Act,17
permits contribution from a joint tort-feasor not joined by the plaintiff in the original
action. In addition, they also require payment by the joint tort-feasor in the original
suit of more than his pro rata share of the plaintiff's judgment before he can obtain a
money judgment from his co-tort-feasor. It is under this type of statute that the
federal courts are in substantial conflict concerning the use of Rule 14(a).
Under this statute the joint tort-feasor in the original suit attempts to accelerate
the claim for contribution by impleading his co-tort-feasor. The courts denying im-
pleader purport to distinguish the right to contribution before payment as a mere
"inchoate right" rather than one in "being" and, therefore, one which is not judi-
cially enforceable as a substantive right until after the defendant has made the req-
uisite payment.' s One court has gone so far as to deny impleader on these grounds
even though the applicable state law permitted impleader. 19 Other courts have al-
lowed impleader on the theory that the right of contribution arose at the time of
the injury-producing negligent acts, the requirement of payment being merely a condi-
12 See statutes cited notes 13 and 16 hulra. But see Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1955); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-627 (1957): "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced where the wrong is a
mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude."
13 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 875; Mic. ComP. LAws § 691.561 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 548.19 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (1953); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. Acr § 211(a).
14 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1947) (applying West Virginia
law); Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943) (apply-
ing New York law); Buckner v. Foster, 105 F. Supp. 270 (E. D. Mich. 1952), aff'd 203 F.2d 527
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953) (applying Michigan law); Vaughn v. Guenther,
8 F.R.D. 157 (N.D. Ga. 1948) (applying Georgia law); Malkin v. Arundel Corp., 36 F. Supp.
948 (D. Md. 1941) (applying Maryland law). But see Pucheu v. National Sur. Corp., 87 F. Supp.
558 (W.D. La. 1949) (applying Louisiana law); Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn.
1942) (applying Minnesota law). However, these latter two courts assumed that under the statute
the joint tort-feasor who was sued could have a later action against his co-tort-feasor after the
conclusion of the original suit. The reasoning in Jeub seems contrary to the plain meaning of
the state statute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.19 (1947). The court in Pucheu appears to be in dis-
agreement with the state court's interpretation of the statute. See De Cuers v. Crane Co., 40 So.
2d 61, 71 (La. App. 1949).
15 Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926), where the court allowed ir-
pleader despite the statutory requirement of a joint judgment and the absence of procedural im-
pleader.
16 See, e.g., ARt. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002 (1947); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17(b) (1957); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-240 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2083 (Supp. 1957).
17 UNIFORM CoNrRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 2(2), 9 U.L.A. 235 (1957). For a list
of states adopting this statute see Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1107 (1954).
18 Geborek v. Briggs Transp. Co., 139 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (applying Wisconsin law);
Fontenot v. Roach, 120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954) (applying Tennessee law); Lamport Co. v.
Teppel, 3 F.R.D. 49 (D.NJ. 1943) (applying New Jersey law).
19 Geborek v. Briggs Transp. Co., supra note 18.
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tion precedent to the satisfaction of the contribution judgment o2 0 However, the original
defendant is entitled to reimbursement only upon payment by him of more than his pro
rata share of the plaintiff's judgment. 21
Support for this position is available in the commissioners' notes which accompany
Section 7 of the 1939 Uniform Act.22 The note explains that the use of impleader "does
not affect in any way the substantive law of contribution," but instead, "merely provides
for a litigation, in advance, of those issues upon which the claim for a money judgment
for contribution will ultimately depend." Other leading authorities are in full accord
with this position.2 3
The Rhode Island act, with which the instant court had to co.tend, is similar to
the second classification. It does not embody a provision for impleader and it does not
seem that impleader is permitted by the Rhode Island courts under these circumstances.
24
However, the mere absence of a state procedural rule does not preclude a litigant's use
of 14(a) in the federal court. Under Erie, the federal courts "retain their independence
in matters of procedure."
25
It is apparent that the decision in the instant case allowing impleader under this
type of statute is in accord with both the leading authorities and the better reasoned
judicial decisions. The court's position on this issue is consistent with Erie since it creates
no new substantive right. It merely provides the original defendant with the procedural
means of avoiding the circuity of action which would otherwise result from the necessity
of bringing a subsequent independent action for contribution. Refusal to permit accelera-
tion of the contribution action deprives Rule 14(a) of all its procedural advantages and,
in addition, defeats the very intent and purpose of the Rule. The very language of Rule
14(a) contemplates a contingent claim, similar to that of contribution, when it speaks
of impleading a party "who is or may be liable" to the defendant.
However, a more complex problem arises with respect to the peculiarity of the
Rhode Island statute. The act is unique in that it provides that "actions for contribution
shall be commenced and sued within two (2) years next after the cause of action shall
accrue to the injured person, and not after."'20 (Emphasis added.) Generally, the period
of limitations starts to run after the defendant has paid more than his pro rata share of
the plaintiff's judgment.2 7 In the instant case, the filing of the third-party complaint and
service of summons on the third-party defendant was within the two year period; how-
ever, the third party defendant interposed no answer until after the two-year period had
run. Consequently, according to the plain meaning of the statute, a state court could no
longer entertain a subsequent action for contribution. In principle, this situation is simi-
lar to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,28 where the Supreme Court re-
fused to apply the federal rules. In that case it was held that the filing of a complaint in
20 Keller v. Kornegay, 9 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.C. 1949) (applying North Carolina law); Mary-
land v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 279 (D. Md. 1947) (applying Maryland law). See also Gersich v.
London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Rosen, 135 Supp. 22 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
21 Cf. Pucheu v. National Sur. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. La. 1949); Jeub v. B/G Foods,
Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 1940).
22 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 248 (1957). This section provides for a third-party practice
similar to Rule 14(a). However, it is interesting to note that no provision for third-party practice
is included in the Revised Act, Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act § 3, 9 U.L.A. 17
(Supp. 1957).
23 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PLEADING § 422 (1950); 3 Moolm, FEDR.
PRACTIcE § 14.03 (2d ed. 1948).
24 In adopting the Uniform Act, the Rhode Island Legislature specifically excluded the pro-
vision for impleader, thereby creating the negative implication. Compare UNIFORM CoN-RmUTaoN
AMONG TORTFEASoRS ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 235 (1957) with RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-6 (1957). The
appellant in the instant case assumed this to be true. Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-9. The annota-
tion to R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. alludes to this practice; however, it contains no Rhode Island cases.
25 2 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 30.
20 R.I. Gm. LAws § 10-6-4 (1956).
27 New York & Puerto Rico S.S. Co. v. Lee's Lighters, 48 F.2d 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1930). See also,
generally, Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 925 (1951).
28 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
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a diversity action pursuant to Rule 329 did not toll the state statute of limitations because
the statute provided that an action was properly commenced so as to toll the statute of
limitations only upon service of summons. A strict observance of the Ragan principle
in this situation, however, would create a procedural morass. On the one hand, the
court would allow the impleader (if brought within the two-year statute of limitations),
since the right and remedy are still alive in the state court. However, if the original action
between the plaintiff and defendant did not result in judgment and payment by the
defendant within two years (a not unlikely result with today's crowded court calendars),
the court would be precluded from enforcing contribution.
The instant court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the
third-party complaint and service of summons on the third-party defendant.3 0 With this,
all the purposes of the statute of limitations were fulfilled since notice of the contingent
claim for contribution was given. No rational justification exists for holding that an
action properly commenced can be dismissed because judgment was not rendered within
a specified period of time. Certainly, neither Erie, Guaranty Trust,3' nor Ragan en-
visioned such an anomalous application of their rules.
Arthur J. Perry
INCOME TAX - CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS - FUNDS DISTRIBUTED BY A CORPORATION
IN REDEMPTION OF STOCK HELD BY A SHAREHOLDER ARE NOT TAXABLE TO THE ONLY
REMAINING SHAREHOLDER UNDER SECTION 115(g) (1), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1939. - Taxpayer, a 50% stockholder of a closely held corporation, assigned an
option to the corporation which gave it the right to purchase the remaining 50% of
its outstanding shares then being held by another corporation. On the very same day
the corporation exercised the option and purchased the shares for $80,000. The re-
sult of the transaction was that the taxpayer became the sole shareholder of the cor-
poration.. The $80,000 was taken from the corpQration surplus and the record in-
dicates that the taxpayer was the motivating force behind the transaction. The Com-
missioner determined that the purchase price should be included as a dividend in
the taxpayer's income for 1951, under Section 115(g) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.1 This determination was upheld by the Tax Court2 and the taxpayer
appealed. Held, reversed. Money distributed by a corporation in redemption of 50%
of its outstanding stock is not taxable as a constructive dividend to the remaining
shareholder, even though the transaction resulted in an increase in the shareholder's
control over the corporation and an appreciation in the value of his stocks. Holsey v.
Commissioner, 2 A.F.T.R. 2d 5660 (3d Cir. 1958). Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d.
The oft-litigated section 115 (g) (1) 3 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code basically
had a simple purpose. It was designed to prevent corporations from making payments
29 FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
30 Cf. Adam v. Vacquier, 48 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1942); Gray v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 36 F. Supp. 780 (D. La. 1941).
81 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g)(1), 53 Stat. 48 (now INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) ).
2 J. R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(g)(1), 53 Stat. 48 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b)):
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was issued
as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the distribution
and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the
distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in a redemption or
cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings
or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend.
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out of surplus to shareholders under the guise of a stock redemption or a partial liqui-
dation, when the corporate purpose was actually the payment of a dividend.4 The
difficulty of discerning a "dividend" within the meaning of the section made it a focal
point of litigation, as both the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers attempted to
determine just when a distribution in redemption of stock was essentially equivalent
to a taxable dividend, as defined in Section 115(a) of the 1939 Code.5
These cases involved corporations which had made a payment of money or prop-
erty to a shareholder in exchange for stock. 6 The first step in determining the ap-
plicability of section 115(g) (1) was the determination of an actual distribution to
the stockholder. The next step was a determination of whether or not the distribu-
tion should be treated as capital gain under Section 117 of the 1939 Code, or as a
distribution essentially equivalent to a divident under section 115(g) (1). This de-
termination was all-important, by reason of the fact that Congress had specifically
excluded certain transactions with respect to stock redemption from the classification
of capital gains by section 115(g) (1).7
In the instant case it was necessary to determine whether money paid by a cor-
poration to a third person was taxable to the sole remaining shareholder. Since the
distribution was not made directly to the shareholder, the question was presented as
to whether the taxpayer was the recipient of income, giving rise to a constructive
dividend. In Wall v. United Statess it was held that when a corporation assumed pay-
ment of a liability for a taxpayer in exchange for stock held by the taxpayer, this
was essentially equivalent to a dividend. The taxpayer purchased the stock and re-
gained sole control of the corporation. He then transferred the stock to the corpora-
tion in exchange for the corporation assuming his note. The court held that it was
precisely the payment of the obligation which constituted income to the taxpayer.
Since the stock redemption had not affected the taxpayer's ownership, the distribution
was equivalent to a dividend.
The same result was reached in Ferro v. Commissioner,9 where the stock exchange
was even more complicated. The taxpayer had purchased all of the shares of another
stockholder in exchange for a promissory note. When the corporation's financial situ-
ation improved the taxpayer returned the stock to the original owner who accepted
it as full payment of the note and then sold the stock to the corporation. The court
held this payment of liability by the corporation was income to the taxpayer, and
the redemption of the stock without a reduction in control brought the transaction
under section 115(g) (1). This doctrine of constructive dividend has been applied
in situations where the actual transfer of income to the taxpayer has been even more
difficult to ascertain.' 0
The courts have declared that a reduction of the taxpayer's control over the cor-
poration is one of the most important factors in determining the true nature of a
stock redemption. When control is proportionately reduced, as, for example when
4 In Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957), the court stated, at 306: "To
prevent taxpayers from avoiding the higher rate of taxation by consummating transactions that are
in form partial liquidations and in actuality disguised dividends, the Congress adopted the 'es-
sentially equivalent' rule of section 115(g)."
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a), 53 Stat. 46 (now INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 316).
6 See, e.g., Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
7 See Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 918 (1954).
8 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
9 242 F.2d 838 (3d. Cir. 1957).
10 For an example of an extended concept of income that was held to be a constructive dividend,
see Zipp v. Commissioner, 58-2 U.S.T.C. f 9546 (6th Cir. 1958), affirming per curiam Louis H. Zipp,
28 T.C. 314 (1957). A closely held family corporation purchased all of the president's stock holding.
The stock was not transferred to the corporation but was transferred directly to the president's sons.
Held, this redemption and transfer resulted in a stock dividend to the sons, taxable under § 115(g) (1)
of the 1939 Code.
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the taxpayer embarks on a gradual withdrawal from the affairs of the corporation, the
distribution made upon the surrender of his stock is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend. This was the factual situation in In re Lukens" where the Third Circuit,
reversing the Tax Court, held that the result was no different from a routine sale
of corporate stock, and therefore the dividend analogy must fail.12 The court stated
that a distribution in redemption of stock can properly be treated as essentially equiv-
alent to a dividend only if it exhibits, or is attended by, significant consequences which
cause it in net effect to resemble a dividend; that is to say, that 115(g) (1) applies
to one who has received a dividend on stock he continues to own.
In Boyle v. Commissioner,'3 the corporation had paid the taxpayer for a portion
of his shares. This payment was held to be a taxable dividend. The court based its
holding on the fact that after distribution there had been no reduction in control and
a substantial reduction in corporate surplus. The court also considered the fact that
the corporation had never paid any cash dividends, there had been no contraction in
corporate activities (thus negating any claim that the transaction was a partial liquida-
tion), and the initiative for the redemption had come from the benefiting share-
holders. The court resolved the problem of distinction between redemption as treas-
ury stock and redemption for retirement by stating that this distinction would only
frustrate the purpose of 115(g) (1). 1 4
The basic test in determining essential equivalence is the "net effect" of the
transaction.' 5 That is, was the taxpayer's relation to the corporation the same after
the distribution as before? Some courts have taken the view that motive is important,
in that a clearly defined business purpose must be found behind the redemption,1 6 as
opposed to private purposes of interested shareholders. But the prevailing view holds
that this is relatively unimportant, and that essential equivalence is to be decided as
a question of fact' 7 by examining all the circumstances of the case, so as to deter-
mine the net effect of the transaction.' s
The only factors present in the instant case which would be helpful in determining
whether or not the taxpayer received a taxable dividend are the fact that his corporate
control was strengthened when the stock was redeemed, and the value of his own
stock was increased by reason of the fact that the redemption was less than the book
value of the stock. But these benefits operate only to increase the value of the stock
as held, and could not be taxable until the stock was sold by the taxpayer.19
It does not seem logical to say that the taxpayer could be taxed under section
115(g) (1), when the other corporation which actually received the distribution was
not taxable because it relinquished all control. Nor does it seem logical to say that
section 115(g)(1) applies to a party who could not be taxed under Section 117 of
the 1939 Code until he disposed of his stock holding, when section 115(g) (1) was
designed to distinguish between capital gain and ordinary income.
The tax court considered this transaction as income to the taxpayer because of
the benefits which he received, without concerning itself with the nature of the dis-
11 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957).
12 See Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.115-9(1939):
A cancellation or redemption by a corporation of a portion of its stock pro rata
among all the shareholders will generally be considered as effecting a distribution
essentially equivalent to a dividend distribution. . . . On the other hand, a cancel-
lation or redemption by a corporation of all of the stock of a particular shareholder,
so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation,
does not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend.
13 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 342 U..S. 817 (1951).
14 187 F.2d at 561.
15 Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957).
16 Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954); Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1951).
17 But the Second Circuit, in Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957), said
that this was to be decided as a question of law.
18 See the various tests set out in Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119, 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 942 (1957).
19 Schmitt v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954).
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tribution. The court of appeals was correct in holding that this transaction did not
result in a taxable dividend to the taxpayer, because the increases in control and in
stock value would not be classified as income until the stock was further transferred. 20
Jerome M. Lynes
INCOME TAX - EXEMPTION - KANSAS - EXEMPTION TO "FEEDER" CORPORA-
TION OF EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION DENIED. - Plaintiff taxpayer is a Kan-
sas corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of alcohol. All of its stock is
owned by the Atchinson Hospital Association, a charitable organization admittedly
exempt from state income tax under Kansas law.' Plaintiff's charter provides that
all of its profits shall belong to the hospital association and never be used for private
profit to any person or corporation, and that its net assets upon dissolution shall be
distributed to the association. It applied to the State Commission of Revenue and
Taxation for exemption under the above provision on the ground that the destination
of income, and not its source, is the ultimate test of exemption. The application was
refused by the Commission, but this order was subsequently reversed by a trial court.
On appeal, held, reversed. A corporation engaged in ordinary commercial activities
and "feeding" its income to an exempt parent organization is not entitled to an ex-
emption from income tax on its profits. Midwest Solvents Co. v. State Comm'n of Reve-
nue & Taxation, 183 Kan. 104, 325 P.2d 311 (1958).
The instant court stated that exemptions from the general burden of taxation are
to be strictly construed, even when applied to charities and other exempt organiza-
tions. This is undoubtedly supported by the Kansas decisions 2 and has in the past
been the traditional view in this country.3 However, the federal courts, while wres-
tling with the "feeder" organization problem, have often preferred a liberal con-
struction of exemption provisions on the policy grounds that the public derives im-
portant benefits from such organizations.
The Kansas statute in question is an adoption of a provision of the Federal In-
ternal Revenue Code,4 identical in the relevant parts. The question presented here
has thus been before the federal courts on a number of occasions.5 It is now largely moot
as far as federal taxation is concerned, for such "feeder" organizations have been
specifically denied exemption by amendment under the federal income tax since 1950,6
but no similar amendment was made to the Kansas statute. These federal cases are
therefore relevent to the present problem.
20 Only time will tell whether the more detailed tests for determining essential equivalence under
Section 302(b), and the new provision concerning constructive ownership of stock under Section
302(c) of the 1954 Code, will result in a wider application of the constructive dividend rule.
1 KAN GEN STAT. ANN. § 79-3204(5) (1949). This section provides exemption for:
(5) corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ...
2 State ex rel. Goodell v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 149 Kan. 84, 87 P.2d 560 (1939).
3 ZOOLLMANN, AmERicAN LAw OF CHARrrEs §§ 686-96, 790 (1924).
4 TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
U Lichter Foundation v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957), and cases cited therein.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 502. It may be noted that this section does not affect the criteria
for identifying an organization whose donors are permitted charitable contributions under TNT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (c)(2)(b). The revelant language used in this section is essentially
similar to that of § 501(c)(3), and has been held to permit deduction of contributions made to
"feeder" organizations. Boman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957).
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The federal cases stem mainly from the Supreme Court's opinion in Trinidad v.
Sagrada Orden,7 which stated that the federal statute "says nothing about the source
of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate test of exemption." Plaintiff
conteded that Trinidad was controlling here since it was decided prior to the adop-.
tion of this provision in Kansas. However, the instant court distinguished the case, in that
it involved an organization engaged primarily and directly in religious work which had
realized a small income from certain incidental sales made within its own organization.
Many of the federal courts of appeals, applying Trinidad in situations involving
"feeder" organizations, did not generally make this distinction. The leading case here,
decided after Kansas had adopted its present income tax law, is Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner.8 A corporation set up to operate a bathing beach business and turn
the profits over to an exempt charitable organization was held to be organized ex-
clusively for a charitable purpose. The court explained that the destination was more
important than the source of the corporation's income and cited Trinidad as authority.
Later cases generally applied the "destination test"9 and by 1951 it was cited as "the
established rationale" in "feeder" situations.10 The same year (subsequently, it might be
noted, to congressional action expressly denying "feeder" organizations an exemption)
saw the first, and possibly the only, definite rejection of the "destination test" in
United States v. Community Services." While this case is distinguishable from the
usual "feeder" case in that although the profits of the "feeder" were distributed to
charity, a non-exempt manufacturing corporation was deriving an important, if not
the main, benefit from the activities of the "feeder" corporation, the Fourth Circuit
left little doubt of its disapproval of the "destination test." The Ninth Circuit could
possibly be said to share this view, though its decisions have varied a great deal de-
pending on the particular facts;' 2 in its own words, it "has not gone overboard in
its application of this statute"'13 but "insists on maintaining its independence."', 4
The court in the present case gave these decisions little consideration in its opin-
ion, other than to say that they were in conflict and not binding since decided after
Kansas adopted its present act. The federal cases employing a liberal construction
of the statute were "merely persuasive" according to the court, citing a prior Kansas
case 15 which did not qualify "persuasive" by "merely," and intended to approve rather
than qualify the consideration of a non-Kansas opinion in such a situation.
Two other aspects of the statute also deserve notice. Kansas specifically exempts
one type of "feeder" organization from its income tax, namely, the corporation or-
ganized to hold property, collect the income from it, and turn the net income over
to an exempt organization. 1 The court inferred from this specific exemption that
the legislature did not intend to exempt any other type of "feeder." The same situ-
ation is true with regard to the federal income tax,' 7 and Judge Learned Hand based
his dissent in Roche's Beach chiefly on the negative implications of this specific ex-
emption. Similarly, the limitation on deductions for charitable contributions from
7 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
8 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
9 See cases cited note 5, supra.
10 C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951). See also Lichter Founda-
tion v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957), where the test is referred to as the "judicially ap-
proved rule."
11 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951).
12 Riker v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 839 (1957); Ralph
H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955); Squire v.' Students Book
Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
13 Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner, supra note 12, at 529.
14 Riker v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 220, 233 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 839 (1957).
15 Standard Steel Works v. Crutcher-Rolfs-Cummings, Inc., 176 Kan. 121, 269 P.2d 402 (1954).
10 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 79-3204(12) (1949).
17 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 501(c) (2).
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corporation's found both in the Kansas 18 and federal acts' 9 reflects a negative im-
plication, although the "destination test" requirement that the "feeder" be bound ab-
solutely to use its profits for its exempt parent's benefit may serve to distinguish this
latter situation.
It is highly questionable whether these rules of construction are really reasons
for, or conclusions drawn from, the result reached in the particular instances. Never-
theless, they seem to furnish the Kansas court with good reason to discount the
federal authorities in view of the settled rule in that state. The policy considerations
favoring charities and other such organizations have been recongnized in the creation
of charitable exemptions. However, their application must be considered in perspec-
tive with competing policy demands, such as the need of the state for revenue and
the fact that exemptions increase the tax burdens of the non-exempt taxpayers. The
relative desirability of encouraging private organizations to carry on beneficial ac-
tivities must be reflected. These organizations often perform functions which the
government would otherwise be called upon to fulfill. On the other hand, organiza-
tions such as religious societies could never be administered by the government. It
is also apparent that favorable tax treatment, especially in the case of religious institu-
tions, has the effect of indirectly subsidizing an organization with a limited appeal at
the expense of the general taxpaying public. In any event, even under a strict con-
struction the exempt parent organization would escape the double taxation to which
the non-exempt stockholder is subject.
Probably the most persuasive factor in this problem is the economic advantage
the tax-exempt "feeder" would have over its less fortunate, though possibly less
worthy, commercial competitors. According to the rationale of the present court
and the federal courts 2o rejecting the "destination test," plaintiff and similar "feeders"
are organized and operated for a two-fold purpose: (1) to engage in commercial
business for profit, and (2) to turn over the profits realized from its commercial ac-
tivities to its exempt parent. The latter, say these courts, is a charitable purposes;
the former is not. Whatever one might say regarding the logical defects in this schizo-
phrenic "purpose" rationale, it is apparent that whenever both elements are present,
aid to the organization's charitable personality through tax emption is necessarily
aid of the business personality. The favored tax treatment would enable the "feeder"
to undersell its rivals, feasibly to the point of eliminating them. This, of course, is
subject to some limitation; there must be income before tax exemptions assume any
importance. Nevertheless, the managers of a tax-exempt "feeder" could be satisfied
with a lower return on the invested capital than if they had to devote a portion of
this return to the payment of an income tax.
In view of these considerations, the court isolated the "feeder," splitting its "per-
son" into commercial and charitable elements. Since the statute required the organ-
ization and operation of the corporation to be exclusively charitable, the court with-
held the exemption because of plaintiff's commercial characteristics. This method
of determining the "charitableness" of an entity, i.e., distinguishing activity accruing
income for charity from activity disepnsing it to charity, is rather narrow. It would
apply in like manner to the simple organization with a single activity closely related
to a charitable purpose2 ' and the complex organization with many activities. The
court should consider all aspects of the entity's operation in determining purpose.
Notwithstanding the criticism one might direct at the court's dissection of the
"feeder" problem, however, it must be admitted that the result reached in the instant
case is well grounded both in case law and policy despite contrary decisions by
many of the federal courts.
Robert E. Curley
18 K N . GEN. STAT. ANx. §§ 79-3206(a)(13), (14) (1949).
19 INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(2).
20 Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955).
21 Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951) (small book store).
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INSURANCE - NEGLIGENCE - INSURER LIABLE IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
FOR MURDER OF INSURED BY BENEFICIARY WHO HAD No INSURABLE INTEREST. -
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the wrongful death of his daughter.'
The defendant insurance companies had issued insurance policies on the life of the
child in favor of an aunt-in-law. The beneficiary-aunt murdered the child to collect the
insurance proceeds. Plaintiff charged the insurance companies with negligence for failure
to use reasonable care to ascertain the aunt-in-law's insurable interest, alleging such
negligence to be the proximate cause of the child's death. The court and jury awarded
a $75,000 judgment. On appeal, held, affirmed. A life insurance company has the duty
to use reasonable care not to issue a policy of life insurance in favor of a beneficiary who
has no insurable interest in the life of the insured. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon,
100 So. 2d 696 (Ala. 1958).
The duty of all persons to exercise reasonable care not to injure another has been
phrased as "an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. ' 2 In order to deter-
mine actionable negligence in the instant case, the court had to extend the purview of
this duty to include an insurance company's investigation in issuing policies to benefici-
aries who have no insurable interest in the life of the insured. The present court ap-
parently found the answer in the policy requiring insurable interest.
It is well established that one cannot take out a valid policy of life insurance for
his own benefit on the life of a person in which he has no insurable interest.3 Several
states have statutory provisions requiring an insurable interest.4 The requirement is ex-
plained as an interest in the preservation of the life insured in spite of the insurance, as
opposed to an interest in the destruction of the life because of the insurance.5 It finds
its basis in opposition to (a) wager contracts as contrary to public policy,6 (b) the
creation of temptation to hasten the death of the insured,7 and (c) public opportunity
to engage in the business of buying and selling policies on the lives of others.8 From
these policy considerations it is safe to conclude that the protection of the insurance
company is never given as a basis for the insurable interest requirement. 9
However, it appears that only the insurer may raise the defense of the lack of
insurable interest, 10 although the insurer may waive the defense or be estopped from
asserting it." Consequently, the rule necessarily inures to the benefit of insurance com-
panies. Where the policy has proved profitable to the insurance company by reason of
the premiums paid being in excess of the policy indemnity, the insurance company can
waive the defense and retain the profits. But where the policy has matured by reason
of an early death of the insured before the premiums paid exceed the indemnity bene-
fits, the company can interpose the defense of lack of insurable interest, refund the
premiums paid, absolve themselves from liability under the policy, and thus avert any
risk that might have been upon them had the policy been valid.
1 Pursuant to ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 119 (1940).
2 PROSSER, TORTS 167 (2d ed. 1955).
3 See, e.g., Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947); VANCE,
INsURANCE 183 (3d ed. 1951); 1 COOLEY, BRIFS ON INSURANCE 330 (2d ed. 1928).
4 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.650 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 512 (1954).
a See Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 25 Hawaii 141 (1919).
6 Knott v. State ex rel. Guaranty Income Life Ins. Co., 136 Fla. 184, 186 So. 788 (1939).
7 Helmetag's Adm'r v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 52 Am. Rep. 316 (1884).
8 Watson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 746 (1944).
9 But see Worthington v. Curtis, L.R. 1 Ch. 419 (1875) where The Life Assurance Act, 1874,
14 Geo. 3, c. 48, § 1, requiring insurable interest was interpreted as constituting "a defence for the
insurance company only, if they choose to avail themselves of it."
10 See e.g., Clements v. Terrell, 167 Ga. 237, 145 S.E. 78 (1928); VANCE, INSURANCE 199 (3d
ed. 1951). But see Smith v. Coleman, 183 Va. 601, 32 S.E.2d 704, rev'd on other grounds, 184 Va.
259, 35 S.E. 2d 107 (1945) where it was held that any interested party may raise the question.
11 Kelly v. Prudential Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 143, 6 A.2d 55 (1939); Lawrence v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
6 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
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With reference to life insurance contracts, the court in the instant case said,
"Policies in violation of the insurable interest rule are not dangerous because they are
illegal; they are illegal because they are dangerous."'" In this we find intimation of
particular emphasis being placed on the danger to the insured when a policy on his life
is issued to a beneficiary not having an insurable interest. The court felt that protection
of human life was a sufficient basis for the law to recognize an obligation on an insurance
company to conform to the particular standard of conduct requiring the insurer to use
reasonable care in investigating insurable interest before issuing a policy of life insurance.
Inherent in the recognition of such a duty is the acknowledgment that a violation
of the duty might proximately cause injury. Here the court was faced with the equally
complex problem of showing the requisite proximate causation. Generally, the proxi-
mate cause question is approached through analysis of distinct problems, among them
being the problem of causation in fact, apportionment of damages among causes, extent
of liability for unforseeable consequences, intervening causes and shifting responsi-
bility.13 In the instant case particular emphasis was placed by the defendant on the un-
foreseeable consequences and intervening cause problems.
Those courts using the foreseeability test to determine proximate cause hold that,
in order for negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury, the injury must be one
which would have been foreseeable to the ordinary prudent man.14 The applicability
of the foreseeability test is to be determined "by considerations of logic, common sense,
justice, policy and precedent."' 5 Here, the court found a duty based on public policy as
presumably effectuated in the insurable interest requirement. They reasoned that not
only was the injury foreseeable, but the danger was judicially recognized and made a
basis for the insurable interest requirement.
The defendants also interposed the theory that the intervening criminal act of
another broke the chain of causation. The majority of the courts have found "liability
where the intervening criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. 16 Again the court
reasoned that the foreseeability of the criminal act in the instant case could hardly be
refuted when the courts have held that the insurable interest rule is designed to give
protection against such acts.
The rule as established by the instant court does not appear to be a harsh one. The
court was apparently aware of the law's inconsistency with the public policy considera-
tions upon which the requirement of insurable interest is based. The requirement is
intended to protect the public, but past applications of the rule have given effective pro-
tection only to insurance companies. Insurers may contend that the public is protected
sufficiently, though indirectly, by the criminal law or by the established rule that a
beneficiary who murders the insured cannot recover the proceeds of the policy.lT How-
ever, the continued recurrence of cases involving policies in the hands of beneficiaries
with no insurable interest, despite the widespread adoption of the insurable interest re-
quirement, seems to be an adequate indication of society's felt need for an additional
safeguard.
The intended protection to the public might be provided by permitting any interested
party to raise the insurable interest question and by invalidating the insurance policy
only with respect to the named beneficiary lacking the insurable interest, with the pay-
12 100 So. 2d at 708.
13 PRossER, TORTS 257 (1955).
34 E.g., Greiving v. La Plante, 156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898, 901 (1942). But see Mahoney v.
Beatman, 110 Conn. 191, 147 At!. 762, 765 (1929), where it was held that the foreseeability test
is not a sound basis for the determination of the extent of the responsibility.
15 Hill v. Day, 39 Del. (9 W.W. Harr.) 400, 199 At!. 920, 922 (1938); 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL LmiLrry 110 (1906).
16 See, e.g., Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.2d 201 (1949); RESTATEMENT, TORTS§ 448 (1934).
17 See Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 COLUm. L. REv. 381 389 (1918).
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ment of the proceeds being made to the heirs of the insured.' 8 This would take the
benefit of the rule from the insurance companies, and might check to some extent the
flow of sales to beneficiaries without insurable interest.
The same result is reached more directly, however, by placing an affirmative duty
on the insurer to investigate the insurable interest of the beneficiary. Penalty for viola-
tion of the duty is heavy enough (as shown by the size of the verdict in the instant case)
to enforce compliance by the companies and thereby allay the fears of those who may
charge that the additional risk will merely be reflected in higher premiums. The duty is
not excessively onerous, however. As the court pointed out, it is no more of an im-
possible burden to require an insurer to exercise reasonable care to determine whether
the beneficiary has an insurable interest in the insured before it issues the policy than
after the insured is dead. The prior effort may prevent the risk of murder. The subse-
quent effort merely effects a saving to the insurance company. To say that protection
of human life is a sufficient basis for a duty of reasonable care is unassailable.
Nicholas J. Neiers
LABOR LAW - SECONDARY BOYCOTT - POLITICAL SUBDIvISION GRANTED PRO-
TECTION FROM SECONDARY BOYCOTT UNDER SECTION 8(b) (4) (A) oF TAFT-HARTLEY
ACT. - The National Labor Relations Board petitioned for an enforcement order to
restrain a secondary boycott initiated by defendant Local 313 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. A county airport commission, a political subdivision
of the State of Delaware, had awarded contracts to various construction companies for
the erection of an airport passenger terminal. Electrical installations were to be per-
formed by a non-union electrical contractor, and the facilities were installed as the
erection of the terminal progressed. Shortly after the work began, a picket line was
formed at the construction site by the defendant union, and employees of the various
construction companies refused to cross the line. In this manner the defendant forced
a work stoppage and prevented the electrical contractor from performing his contract.
The contractor subsequently charged defendant with an unfair labor practice. The Board
found that the purpose of defendant's conduct was to force the airport commission to
cease doing business with the electrical contractor.' Local 313 was charged with viola-
tion of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 Held, petition granted. A political
subdivision is a "person" within the meaning of section 8(b) (4) (A) and may therefore
be protected against a secondary boycott. NLRB v. Local 313, International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 254 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1958).
Section 8(b) (4) (A), regarding secondary boycotts, makes it unlawful for a labor
organization:
(4) . . . to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in ...
a concerted refusal in the course of their employment . . . to perform any services,
where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other
person ... to cease doing business with any other person .... 3 [Emphasis added.]
Section 2(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, in defining the term "employer," specifically ex-
cludes any person subject to the Railway Labor Act and any political subdivision 4 such
as the New Castle Airport Commission. In its definition of "person" however, the
18 See Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274 (1894); Note, 11 N.Y.U. IN-r.A. L. Rav.
239 (1956).
1 Peter D. Furness Elec. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 437, 438 (1957).
2 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952).
3 Ibid.
4 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952).
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inclusive method of defining the term fails to mention a governmental agency.5 In the
light of these provisions, the apparent conclusion is that Congress, in excluding a politi-
cal subdivision as an employer, intended that the entire act should be made inapplicable
to it.
A labor union is restrained by 8(b) (4) (A) when the object of the enumerated
activities is to force any employer or other person to cease doing business with any
other person. The interpretation of the phrase "or other person" is brought to light in
the instant case. The question presented to the court was: "Did Congress intend by
this phrase to include within this provision groups which, by virtue of another section,
are excluded from the operation of the act?"
The present issue was first presented to the NLRB in 1950 in the Al J. Schneider
Co. case.6 The facts were similar to those presented in the instant case. There the union,
through picketing activities, induced the employees of Schneider to cease work on a
contract with the Board of Education of Owensboro, Kentucky. These union activities
were intended to coerce the Board of Education, a political subdivision, to refrain from
dealing with a third party. The Board held that a political subdivision was not within
the purview of 8(b) (4) (A) since the act excluded it as an employer. The Board decided
that Congress- legislated a scheme of correlative rights and duties from which the govern-
ment was expressly excluded. This scheme would have been violated if an excluded
group was granted protection under 8(b) (4) (A) and at the same time was immune
from charges of unfair labor practices.7 This strict construction of the terms "employer"
and "person" as used in the secondary boycott provision was adopted by the Board in
subsequent decisions.8
The Board's position was strengthened by the decision of the District of Columbia
Circuit in DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB.9 Relief was denied to the plaintiff
when an agricultural union, a group excluded from the provisions of the act, induced
other parties to cease handling the plaintiff's products. The reasoning of the court co-
incided with that of the Board in the Schneider case. In addition to the cases involving
agricultural workers and political subdivisions, the Board later included within the scope
of their reasoning persons subject to the Railway Labor Act. Protection under 8(b) (4)
(A) was denied when a labor organization coerced the employees of a railroad to cease
transporting the products of another employer.10
The courts on the other hand, have adopted a liberal interpretation of 8 (b) (4) (A).
Groups excluded from the provisions of the act under the definition of employer and
employee have been granted protection from secondary boycotts. The reasons for doing
so are based on two grounds - the interpretation of "any employer" and "person" as
used in 8(b) (4) (A).
The courts stated their position in 1950 when the 5th Circuit decided International
Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB."1 The petitioner in that case sought to enjoin a secondary
boycott ordered by the union. The picketing extended to the tracks of certain railroad
companies. Relief had been denied by the Board. In reversing the Board's decision, the
court inferred that Congress' use of the word "any" before the word "employer" indi-
cated that protection from secondary boycotts was to be granted to all employers. The
phrase was interpreted in its generic sense and was not restricted to the defined meaning
5 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1952).
6 89 N.LR.B. 221 (1950).
7 Al 3. Schneider Co., supra note 6, at 223.
8 Paper Makers Importing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 267 (1956); Sprys Elec. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 1128
(1953).
9 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
10 W. T. Smith Lumber Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1756, 1760 (1956), rev'd, W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v.
NLRB 246 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1957).
11 International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds,
341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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as set out in section 2(2) of the act. The court reasoned that if Congress intended to
restrict the application of this provision, an indefinite article such as "an" employer
would have been used.
The second basis for judicial liberalization of the prohibition of secondary boycotts
is the interpretation of "person." The act defines the term as "one or more individuals,
labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trus-
tees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers."'1 2 Neither a political subdivision nor a person
subject to the Railway Labor Act were expressly excluded. However, in the celebrated
"Piggy-back" case, Local 25, Teamsters Union v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,13 the
Supreme Court indicated that the term was to be construed liberally. In that case a
railroad hauled trailers which normally were driven over highways by motor carriers.
This freight hauling by the railroad was popularly known as "piggy-backing." The union
prevented these trailers from being delivered to the freight yard. Denouncing this union
activity the Court said:
We think it clear that Congress, in excluding 'any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act' from the statutory definition of 'employer,' carved out of the Labor Management
Relations Act the railroads' employer-employee relationships which were, and are,
governed by the Railway Labor Act .... Furthermore, since railroads are not ex-
cluded from the Act's definition of 'person', they are entitled to Board protection from
the kind of unfair labor practice proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(A).14 [Emphasis added.]
This dictum has formed the basis for several judicial decisions.1
In the instant case, the Board reversed its former position announced in the
Schneider case and held that a political subdivision was a person within the meaning of
8(b) (4) (A).16 The dictum enunciated in the "Piggy-back" case was a major factor in
pursuading the Board despite the fact that the cases are distinguishable. The instant
court, while affirming the Board's decision, emphasized this factor with the statement
that the "point is not sun clear."'17
Whether the view formerly taken by the Board before the persuasive dictum in the
"Piggy-back" case is to be preferred over the judicial position is fundamentally a ques-
tion of congressional intent. Congress has recognized that secondary boycotts, regardless
of the parties involved, are inimical to the public welfare.' 8 The courts reason that Con-
gress in enacting this provision intended to protect commerce from injury, impairment
and interruption. To accomplish this, all employers and persons should be granted pro-
tection from secondary boycotts.' 9
However, Congress has also explained that its reason for exempting persons subject
to the Railway Labor Act "is to make it perfectly clear that in providing remedies for
unfair labor practices of unions and their agents it was not intended to include such
employees."'20 The significance of the instant decision lies in the inequitable status im-
posed on a union in relation to a political subdivision. The Commission may be afforded
protection under 8(b) (4) (A) but at the same time, labor unions may not charge it
with an employer unfair labor practice, since a political subdivision is not an employer
for the purposes of the act. The more cogent arguments rest in the reasoning of the
Board, for if Congress had intended to include a political subdivision within the
definition of "person," it would have done so since the other entities are expressly
enumerated.2 1.
12 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1952).
13 350 U.S. 155, 160 (1956).
14 Local 25, Teamsters Union v. New York N.H. & H.R.R., supra note 13 at 160 (dictum).
15 W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1957). Douds v. Seafarers' Int'l
Union, 148 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
16 Peter D. Furness Elec. Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 437 (1957).
17 254 F.2d at 224.
IS 93 CONG. Rac. 4836, 4843 (1947) (remarks of Senators Ball & Smith).
19 Local 25, Teamsters Union v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956); International
Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 665
(1951).
20 S. RE. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
21 Al 3. Schneider Co.. 89 N.L.R.B. 221 (1950).
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It is submitted, however, that the motive for the position taken by the judiciary
rather than the reasoning advanced by the courts bears more weight in determining the
correct position. The instant court stated that it was a matter of public policy that pro-
tection from an unfair labor practice be granted to an entity even though that entity is
not subjected to the statutory obligations of an "employer."
Gordon C. Ho
TORTS - HUSBAND AND WIFE - MARRIAGE OF PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDENT PRIOR
TO JUDGMENT EXTINGUISHES RIGHT OF ACTION FOR ANTENUPTIAL TORT. - Plaintiff,
while a passenger in defendant's automobile, was injured in a collision with another
vehicle. The accident occurred in the state of New York, but plaintiff instituted suit in
New Jersey, where both she and defendant are domiciled. Six months after instituting
this action, but prior to the trial, plaintiff married defendant. On appeal from a decision
of the appellate division reversing summary judgment for defendant, held, reversed. The
public policy of New Jersey prohibits personal tort actions between husband and wife.1
Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
At common law, husband and wife were considered as one legal entity and, con-
sequently, no actions between spouses were permitted. Beginning about 1844, statutes
known as Married Women's Acts were enacted in all American jurisdictions, securing
to married women a separate legal identity from their husband and a separate legal
estate in their own property.2 However, a majority of these jurisdictions have not con-
strued these statutes to authorize suits for personal torts between husband and wife.3
Many were persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Thomp-
son v. Thompson,4 where a District of Columbia statute,5 authorizing married women
to sue separately for torts committed against them as fully and freely as if they were
unmarried, was held not to allow a wife to sue her husband for assault and battery.
The maintenance of the peace and harmony of the home seems to be the policy
most often cited in favor of disallowing interspousal suits.6 Also the existence of liability
insurance in cases arising out of automobile accidents has given rise to the fear of
collusion as a policy reason for maintaining the disability. 7 The fact that insurance
companies usually conduct the defense in actions against their insured, however, would
seem adequate protection against the possibility of collusion in suits of this type. Nor
would such an action tend to disrupt the peace and harmony of the home since it must
be assumed that both spouses will be interested in reimbursing the joint family exchequer
for medical expenses incurred as the result of the other's negligence.8
In the instant case, the majority relied on the section of the New Jersey Married
Persons Act which specifies: "Nothing in this chapter contained shall enable a husband
or wife to contract with or to sue each other, except as heretofore, and except as author-
ized by this chapter." 9 However, the plaintiff in the instant case was not married to the
defendant either at the time of the accident or at the time the suit was filed. The minority
felt that this fact required the application of other sections of the act,1 0 one of which
1 N.J. STAT. ANu. § 37:2-5 (1940).
2 PROssER, ToRTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
3 E.g., Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955); Ferguson v. Davis, 48
Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954); Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P.2d 422 (1951). See
also Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 Go. L.J. 697, 713 (1939). Pennsylvania
specifically prohibits such suits by statute. PA. STAT. ANt. tit. 48, § 111 (1930).
4 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-208 (1951).
6 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 674. See also Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 SXE.2d 335
(1949), where the court dismissed an action for wrongful death brought by the administrator of the
wife's estate against the husband's estate on the ground that the public policy was to discourage litiga-
tion between spouses since it tended to produce a disruption of their relation.
7 Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
8 Haglund, Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 Gao. L.U. 893, 915-16 (1939).
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-5 (1940).
10 141 A.2d at 45.
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provides that, if a female plaintiff marries after she has instituted a legal action, the
action shall not abate but proceed to final judgment notwithstanding such marriage."
While most of the jurisdictions prohibiting interspousal tort actions have held that
a marriage of the parties will extinguish the right of action for antenuptial torts not
reduced to judgment,' 2 some have allowed the suit on the ground that the wife's cause
of action was her separate property, for the protection of which she could maintain an
action against her husband.' 8 In Curtis v. Wilcox,14 an English court placed such a
construction on the provisions of its statute, which are similar to those contained in the
New Jersey Act.' 5
A further complication of the instant case arises from the fact that the situs of the
alleged tort was New York, which has, by statute, expressly removed a wife's disability
to sue her husband for personal injuries.16 In similar situations, jurisdictions allowing
interspousal tort actions have not hesitated to apply the lex loci against their own resi-
dents, even though that law would bar the action.' 7 In contrast, states which prohibit
such suits have refused to apply the lex loci where that law permits interspousal suits,
as this would violate the public policy of the forum state.' 8 There is some question as to
the constitutional validity of such refusal, however, in view of the Supreme Court's re-
cent enforcement of foreign statutes in the forum state under the full faith and credit
clause, despite the forum's decision that such statutes contravened the public policy of
the forum state.19
The practical effects of refusing a remedy in interspousal tort actions add little to
the attempt to equate law with justice. The most frequent occupants of the increasingly
dangerous family automobile, the husband and wife, remain unprotected by liability
insurance. Notwithstanding this consideration, the factual situation of the instant case
furnishes an even stronger ground for criticizing the decision. Since the antenuptial tort
situation was one of first instance before the New Jersey Supreme Court, it is difficult
to see any "strong public policy" against such suits as was found by the majority in the
New Jersey Married Persons Act. As the minority pointed out, two sections of the same
act seem contrary to such a conclusion. In effect, this holding amounts to a windfall for
liability insurance companies. The engaged couple is left with the unhappy choice of
either postponing their marriage until the injured party's suit can be reduced to judg-
ment, a process which may take years in the larger metropolitan centers, or beginning
their wedded life under the burden of medical and other expenses with no hope of com-
pensation. That such a result is required by the plain meaning of the statute is highly
questionable.
Donald A. Garrity
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW - ATTORNEYS - ATTORNEY ADMITTED TO FED-
ERAL BAR ENJOINED FROM PRACTICING LAW WITHIN THE STATE. - Plaintiffs, members
of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Philadelphia Bar Association, brought
action to enjoin defendant from holding himself out as a practicing attorney within
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-7 (1940).
12 E.g., Carmicheal v. Carmicheal, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116 (1936); Patenaude v. Patenaude,
195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
13 Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1956); Corver v. Ferguson, 40 Cal. App. 2d
459, 254 P.2d 44 (1953); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920). See also Curtis v.
Wilcox, [1948] 2 K.B. 474.
14 [1948] 2 LB. 474. But see Baylis v. Blackwell, [1952] 1 LB. 154.
15 Compare The Married Woman's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75, §§ 12, 24, with N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-12, 1:1-2 (1940).
16 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57.
17 Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955); Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438,
46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
1S Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d
597 (1936); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
19 Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951).
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Philadelphia County in violation of the Pennsylvania Unauthorized Practice Statute.'
Defendant was admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court and various other federal
courts, including that of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The facts indicate that
the defendant had law offices within the county and that he listed himself as an attorney
in the telephone book and in a legal directory. Defendant claimed the legal right to
practice law anywhere in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with regard to any legal
matter in which a federal question was involved. The lower court granted the injunction,
and defendant appealed. Held: affirmed. The injunction did not infringe upon any federal
rights guaranteed the appellant by either the statutes or the Constitution of the United
States. Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958).
It is generally accepted that the right to control and regulate the practice of law is
held by the states and the right to practice law is not a privilege or immunity guaranteed
citizens by the Federal Constitution. 2 The states have this control in the interest of public
protection because of the public nature of legal services and the fact that the attorney
is essentially a public officer.3 It is for the supreme court of a state to construe the state
statutes relating to the practice of law.4 The problem presented to this court represents
one of many difficulties created by our peculiar federal-state relationship. In order to
have the federal court system function effectively, virtually all the trial and appellate
courts must be located within the confines of one or more states. The issue presented
by the instant case is whether a state has the power to restrict the practice of law of an
attorney admitted to the federal bar within the state.
The facts and pleadings clearly demonstrate that appellant was not asking to be
allowed to practice before the state courts, and it is equally apparent that the issued
injunction in no way interfered with his right to try cases before the federal district
court.5 However, the "practice of law" also includes advice given to clients outside the
courtroom and the preparation of legal documents of a nature beyond the knowledge
of the ordinary layman.6 It was against these practices that the Unauthorized Practice
Statute 7 was primarily aimed in order to protect the public from the dire consequences
of entrusting legal matters to unfit or untrained persons.8 These two areas are deserving
of special consideration since they exist outside the domain of the public court pro-
ceeding and the watchful eye of the judge.9
The instant court sustained the constitutionality of the Unauthorized Practice Act,
relying on Commonwealth v. Branthoover,10 decided under the original act of 1899.11
It should be pointed out, however, that the problem presented here would never have
arisen under the original act since the advertising forbidden was restricted to that repre-
senting the accused "as being entitled to practice law before the courts of the country
... ,"21 (Emphasis added.) Thus, in Commonwealth v. Branthoover, if the attorney were
admitted to practice in the federal court, the statute would not preclude his holding
himself out as an attorney outside the courtroom.' 8 In 1913, however, the act was
amended to include one representing himself as an attorney of any other state, nation,
country or land, and the practice of law outside the court as well as before the tribunal
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (Supp. 1957).
2 BradweU, v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
3 Keeley v. Evans, 271 Fed. 520 (D. Ore. 1921).
4 In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
5 139 A.2d at 893.
6 Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 At. 20 (1937).
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (Supp. 1957).
8 Burch v. Mellor, 43 Pa. D. & C. 597 (1942); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934).
9 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
10 24 Pa. County Ct 353, 48 Pittsb. Leg. 3. (O.S.) 267 (1901).
11 Pa. Laws 1899, No. 95.
12 Ibid.
Is 24 Pa. County Ct. 353, 48 Pittsb. Leg. J. (O.S.) 267, 269 (1901). See also Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46 (1917).
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itself.14 Therefore, this amendment, and not the original act, specifically prohibited the
conduct of the defendant in the instant case. The present court's reliance on Branthoover,
decided prior to the amendment, was unwarranted.
The dissent discusses, at great length, the fitness of defendant to practice law.' 5
Yet it was never contended that defendant was unfit, but only that he had violated the
statute, which makes no mention of fitness. The fact that defendant has fulfilled the re-
quirements of the highest federal courts would at first glance seem to preclude any
challenge of unfitness. However, the requirements of some other federal courts are
definitely inferior to the states within which they are located.16 The majority may have
feared the precedent it would have created by ruling for the defendant in the instant case.
The few cases decided under the present statute gave the court little aid in reaching
its decision. In one instance, an injunction was granted restraining a person from
habitually drafting legal papers, such as trust agreements and wills, for consideration,
and from holding herself out as being capable of doing this work.17 Also, it was held to
be unauthorized practice of law for an insurer's agent to appear at a workmen's com-
pensation hearing to represent litigants, although he could prepare the forms to be used
because this merely entailed the filling out of standardized forms supplied by the
Board.' 8 In Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau,19 although it was held that a corpora-
tion could not retain an employee to represent its customers before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, an employee could appear independently before the Commission
and could also advertise his competency in such appearances, since the ICC regulates
its own bar and by examination passes on the character of its applicants.
In the instant case, all forms of holding out as alleged in the complaint were en-
joined. Defendant may not even set himself up as a limited attorney. This emphasized
the element of public protection in forbidding any use of the term "attorney-at-law" by
an unauthorized person, even where limited by an expressed area of specialization. 20
It is submitted that the court's action was a valid exercise of state sovereignty in an area
where such action is necessary and proper. The solution to the instant problem lies not
in diluting the power of the state to regulate the practice of law, but in systematizing
the requirements of admission to the federal courts. In twenty-two district courts, a rule
obtains which obviates the difficulty encountered here and re-enforces the idea of state
sovereignty in admission procedure, i.e., one may practice in such district courts only
after being licensed to practice in the state where the district is located.2 1
Under the decisions in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins22 and Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York,2 3 a large amount of the litigation in the federal courts is governed by state sub-
stantive law. It follows that a competent practitioner in the federal courts should have a
familiarity with state law and there is no better way to insure such competency than to
require the attorney to meet such standards as the state bar may prescribe for the prac-
tice of law within its borders. This would insure the public fair and adequate representa-
tion from every person holding himself out as an attorney within that state.
F. James Kane
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1930). The statute in its present form is essentially the same as
the amendment. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (Supp. 1957).
15 139 A.2d at 894.
16 Admission to the bar of the Supreme Court is by motion, conditioned only upon three years past
admission in the highest court of any state, territory or insular possession. In seven of the eleven
Courts of Appeals, the same requirement will suffice. Only two District Courts require that an exami-
nation be taken. Williamson, Disparate Rules of Admission in Federal Courts, 42 A.B.A.J. 720 (1956).
17 Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Ad. 883 (1934).
18 Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 At. 20 (1937).
19 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (1941).
20 See also People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 Pac. 349 (1908).
21 Williamson, op. cit. supra note 16, at 721.
22 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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WARRANTY - NEGLIGENCE - NEGLIGENT MANUFACTURER LIABLE FOR BREACH
OF IMPLIED WARRANTY DESPITE LACK OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT. - Plaintiff owned
several resort cottages, one of which was built upon cinder blocks manufactured by
defendant. The blocks had been purchased from defendant by plaintiff's building con-
tractor. A few months after the cottage was built the blocks cracked causing dam-
age to the cottage and, consequently, plaintiff brought action for breach of warranty.
The trial court found a breach of implied warranty but denied recovery in the ab-
sence of privity of contract. On appeal, held, reversed. Lack of privity of contract
will not preclude a remote vendee from recovering from a manufacturer in an action
based on negligence or breach of implied warranty. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
The doctrine of privity of contract in a negligence action is a disappearing en-
igma in the law. The rule was fashioned from the case of Winterbottom v. Wright"
where a coach driver was denied recovery from the owner of the vehicle for injuries
resulting from negligence in its maintenance. His recovery was precluded because he
was not a party to a maintenance contract between the owner and his employer, the
operator of the coach. Subsequent cases relied on dictum in this case to formulate
a general rule of non-liability in the absence of privity.2
Thomas v. Winchester3 provided an exception to the rule. If the article made
was inherently dangerous, e.g., a poison, the manufacturer would be liable for his
negligence regardless of privity. In MacPherson v. Buick Motors Co.,4 Cardozo J., ex-
panded this exception by winding the scope of inherently dangerous products to in-
clude those which, if negligently made, would endanger the purchaser or anyone who
would in due course use the article. The exception soon appeared larger than the
rule itself. The decisions interpreting MacPherson have tended to ignore the require-
ment that the article be "imminently," "intrinsically," or "inherently" dangerous, and
have permitted recovery if the defective article could reasonably be foreseen to cause
injury to a person using it.5 However, this movement has been sporadic and within
the same jurisdiction it has been held that a negligently made coffee-urn handle would
qualify as a dangerous object,6 while a negligently made automobile-door handle
would not.7 Other courts feel that some objects can never be "inherently dangerous"
and negligence of the manufacturer will not render him liable for injury to a remote
vendee.8
Massachusetts has taken the lead in the attempt to obliterate the general rule. In
Carter v. Yardley & Co.,9 a plaintiff recovered for injury from a skin disease caused
by the use of cosmetics. Although the cosmetic could easily have been found "in-
herently dangerous," the court felt that MacPherson had "caused the exception to
swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule
could operate."' 0 The court then concluded that the rule no longer existed.
The reaction to this case has been varied. Although the decision has not been
extensively cited, it has met with some degree of approval in various jurisdictions.
The First Circuit has assumed that the Supreme Court of Mississippi would reverse
1 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
2 See generally Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 698 (1946).
3 6 N.Y. (2 Seld.) 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
4 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5 PRossER, ToPrs 500 (2d ed. 1955).
0 Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 247 App. Div. 895, 287 N.Y. Supp. 118 (2d Dep't), affd
per curiam, 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E.2d 415 (1936).
7 Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 240 App. Div. 18, 268 N.Y. Supp. 545 (1st Dep't
1934).
8 Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (shoes); Isbel v. Biederman Furniture Co., 115 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1938) (wooden bed);
Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408, 262 S.W. 583 (1924) (porch swing hook).
9 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
10 Id. at 700.
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its former holdings requiring privity of contract in negligence actions, citing the
Yardley case as support for the modern trend." Some states have spoken of Yardley
but have disposed of the cases at hand either by using the established exceptions to
the rule of privity,12 or by observing that, even if the rule of privity were completely
abandoned, recovery could not be had because of failure of proof.'3 Other states have
recognized the validity of the Yardley case.' 4
The rationale in MacPherson and Yardley is not limited to personal injuries
alone. Once the normal concept of negligence plus proximate cause is accepted as
the basis for suit by a remote vendee against a manufacturer, the courts are not in-
clined to differentiate between personal injury and property damage.' 5
In the instant case, plaintiff's suit was for breach of express or implied warranty.
In the majority opinion, the court spoke at great length of the Yardley case and
cited it as the culmination of the modern trend. But Yardley does not stand for the
proposition that privity is unnecessary in an action for breach of warranty. The court
in Yardley considered only the question of liability for negligence in the absence of
privity.1'
If the majority has intimated that privity is unnecessary in a suit on warranty,
its position is contrary to existing case law. The general rule that privity is required
in any breach of warranty suit still obtains.17 An exception to this rule has been rec-
ognized in the case of foodstuffs.' 8 The furthest extension of this exception is found
in cases where the producer has by extensive advertising warranted his product to the
public at large. In a very recent case, a remote vendee sued the manufacturer of a na-
tionally advertised home permanent for breach of express warranty. The court allowed
recovery notwithstanding a lack of direct contractual relationship between them.19
This hesitancy to abandon the requirement of privity indicates an attempt by the
courts to shield the manufacturer from strict liability to the remote vendee in war-
ranty actions which, for all practical purposes, would provide recovery on a mere
showing of damages.
However, the court in the instant case may have adhered to the requirement of
privity in warranty suits. Although it equated implied warranty with negligence and
said that a remedy would not be withheld for failure to plead negligence, it neverthe-
less cautioned future litigants to make an express allegation of negligence in cases
of this type.2 0 This warning suggests that the majority does not intend to use the
terms "implied warranty" and "negligence" interchangeably in the future. The court's
action in equating them is not without basis, at least in theory. Implied warranty is
a curious hybrid of both tort and contract. It involves the violation of a duty not
assumed voluntarily, but enforced irrespective of any agreement. 21 Originally the
remedy for breach of warranty was in tort, in an action similar to deceit, except that
knowledge of the falsity of the affirmation was not required. Later, either by design
or convenience, assumpsit was used although the requirements of the action were
not changed.2 2 The nature of the action still resembles tort in that recovery is had
11 Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
815 (1957).
12 Stout v. Madden, 208 Ore. 294, 300 P.2d 461 (1956).
13 H. M. Gleason & Co. v. International Havester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E.2d 904 (1955).
14 See Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954).
15 See Gruman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015, 1021 (1955). See also Todd Ship-
yard Corp. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 609 (D. Me. 1947).
16 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1946).
17 1 WILLISTON, SALES 645-48 (Rev. ed. 1948).
18 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (Ist Cir. 1958);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
19 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
20 90 N.W.2d at 879.
21 PROSSER, TORTS 493 (2d ed. 1955).
22 1 WiLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 17, §§ 195-97.
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only when the manufacturer has violated an assumed duty. One leading authority
feels that because of this strong tortious element, a convincing argument can be made
for removing the "privity" rule in actions on implied warranty.23 Consequently, the
similarity of the actions, added to the expense involved in re-litigating the case, and
the possibility that the defenses of the statute of limitations or res judicata would be
raised to bar a new action may have persuaded the court in that instant case to cut
through the preventive form for the purpose of doing justice.
The court in adopting the Yardley rationale and ridding itself of the outmoded
concept of privity in negligence suits has greatly clarified and advanced the law of
Michigan. However, its position on warranty and privity remains unsettled. The
tenor of the majority opinion suggests that if the need arises the court will feel no
qualms in again dispensing with the requirement of privity in breach of implied war-
ranty actions.
Matthew T. Hogan
23 Prosser, Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNN. L. R~v. 117, 119 (1943). See also
2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 1573 (1956).
